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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
PLAINTIFF WAS IN A POSTURE TO PROVE HIS CASE WITH-
OUT ADDITIONAL EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
In his brief the Respondent argues that Appellant 
could not have proved his case without expert testimony. 
Respondent's brief does not contest the law pronounced 
in Appellant's brief to the effect that it is an abuse 
discretion to grant a dismissal for failure to prosecute 
when Plaintiff is present in Court and ready to proceed. 
Respondent claims that because the Trial Court found 
that Plaintiff could not have proved a case without ex- ; 
pert testimony, it was proper to deny the Plaintiff the 
opportunity to proceed at trial. The Court did not make 
such a finding. It is clear that the Court did not rely 
on this fact in granting the dismissal. Further Appel-
lant could have proved a cause of action with only those 
witnesses and parties that were present. 
Respondent's brief basically cites the law cor-
rectly concerning the use of expert witnesses in medical 
malpractice cases when it states that expert testimony 
is necessary to establish the degree of care and skill 
required of a doctor in the community in which he prac-
tices and to establish proximate cause. Bur Respondent 
fails to explaint the cases in which expert testimony 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is not necessary. In Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 
40, 347 P2d 1108 (1959), relied on in Respondent's brief, 
the Court states: 
"This Court has held that expert testimony is 
unnecessary to establish liability in mal-
practice cases only where the question of 
propriety of treatment of a patient by a 
physician is a matter of common knowledge 
of layman or where a physician shows a gross 
neglect or want of care and skill such as 
leaving medical supplies in the incision of 
a patient." 
This exception was also explained in Huggins v. 
Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P2d 523 (1957), also relied 
on by Respondent. The Court in that case stated, quot-
ing Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P2d 772 (1951), 
"There is, however, another well recognized
 s 
rule holding that when facts may be ascer-
tained by the ordinary use of the senses of 
lay witnesses, it is not necessary that ex-
pert testimony be produced and relied upon." 
It is clear that if a cause of action can be 
proved in which the facts may be ascertained by lay 
witnesses, it is not necessary to use expert witnesses. 
Such a case could have been proved if the Trial Court 
had allowed Appellant to proceed. 
A physician has a duty to disclose his diagnosis 
to the patient so that the patient may intelligently 
treat himself and failure to do so constitutes negli-
gence. In the case of Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 
197 P1043 (1921) , Plaintiff was being treated for acne 
by Defendant, a physician. Defendant told Plaintiff he 
suffered only from acne and even certified in writing Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that he was suffering from acne and was not afflicted 
with any venereal disease. Plaintiff later became para-
lized from the waist down and sued the physician for 
his failure to inform him that he had syphilis and to 
properly treat him. Defendant admitted that he had 
known all along that Plaintiff was afflicted with syph-
ilis. In ruling on the duty of a physician to inform 
the patient of the nature of his affliction, the Court 
stated, 
"It is incumbent upon a physician to give 
such instructions as are proper and neces-
sary for the patient or his nurses and 
attendants to act intelligently in the 
further treatment of the case, and a fail-
ure to do so is negligence which will ren-
der him liable for injury resulting there- • 
from." 
The essence of this rule is followed in 61 Am. 
Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons Etc. §100, wherein it is 
stated: 
"The physician naturally is in a position 
of trust and confidence as regards the 
patient, and his opportunities to influence 
the patient are unusual. Hence all trans-
actions between physician and patient are 
closely scrutinized by the courts, which 
must be assured of the fairness of those 
dealings. As a result of the fiducial 
nature of the relationship between a physi-
cian and patient, a physician has the duty 
to reveal to the patient that which in his 
best interest it is important that he should 
know." 
The law is clear that a cause of action can be 
stated by showing that Dr. Fishier failed to inform the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
Maxfields of their daughter's physical defect so that 
corrective action could be taken. The question of 
whether the Maxfields were so informed can be deter-
mined by a jury without the assistance of expert testi-
mony. In order to establish that the physical defect 
was easily observable to one familiar with the anatomy 
of that part of the body, Dr. Fishier could have been 
called as a hostile witness. His testimony could esta-
blish that he knew or should have known of the defect. 
This is sufficient to state a cause of action without 
the use of expert testimony. The practice of calling 
the defendant as a hostile expert witness is well esta-
blished and was used in the Marsh and Huggins cases, ? 
supra. 
Respondent's claim that Plaintiff could not prove 
his case without the presence of expert witnesses is 
incorrect. A cause of action could have been proved. 
Because Plaintiff could have proved his case, it is 
undisputed that it was error for the trial court to -
grant a dismissal for failure to prosecute when the 
Plaintiff was present in Court and ready to proceed. 
POINT II. 
STATES STEAMSHIP CO. V. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, 426 
F. 2d 803 (9th Cir, 1970) SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S POSITION 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
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Both the Respondent and Appellant rely upon the 
case o States Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 
4 2 6 (I 8 0 3 (91 1 i C i t: , 1 9 7 0) Tl Ie cas e c i tft s f o u r 
factors which should be considered in ruling oi; •1'. -
missal for failure " orosecute pursuant to Rule 41 (b). 
Respondent feels that the present case should have been 
dismissed in light of the standards enunciated in that 
c a s e. B ii t u p o u a n a 1 y s i s o f t h e f a c t o r s s u g g e s t e d b y 
that case, it is aparent that those factors indicate 
that the present case should not be dismissed. 
T\v first factor suggested by the 9th Circui t is' 
the Appellant's right f. .• hearing on his claim. The 
;." - • . • o n e (i) f i 11 i e in o s t b a s i c t e n e t s 
' our system of jurisprudence. It should be denied 
only ii i the most extreme cases. If it can. possibly be 
• granted w:i thout substantial injury i .o the Defendant c: n 
the judicial system, the Plaintiff should be given a 
hearing on his claim. There certai nl y w< :>i i] d have been 
no injury to thp Court in the present case. The case 
was scheduled on the docket, a jury had been impaneled, 
and the: ; Cour t: wai 3 ready I: :< : » proceed. It wou] d 
disrupted the Court's schedule or resulted in increased 
expense if the case had been allowed to proceed. The 
most significant injury caused the Defendant would be 
impairment of his defenses, which is discussed as the 
second Factor suggested - -...lie States Steamship case. " 
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Except for the possible injury to the Defendant, there 
is no reason why the Appellants should not be given 
their day in Court, 
The second factor cited by the 9th Circuit is 
the impairment of the Defendant's defenses which is pre-
sumed from the delay. The reason such impairment is 
presumed is that a lapse of time fogs the memory of 
Defendant's witnesses, may result in evidence being 
lost or destroyed, and often results in a witness no 
longer being available because of death or his moving 
from the jurisdiction. But this presumption is rebutted 
in the present case. All of Defendant's witnesses in 
this case are doctors. Their testimony will be based
 ? 
on treatment of the Plaintiff which was recorded in 
writing in detail at the time it was performed. Thus 
loss of memory on behalf of Defendant's witnesses will 
be nominal. All of the physical evidence in this case 
consists of medical records which have been preserved 
and are still available. All of the witnesses which 
would be used by Defendant are still living and subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Court. It becomes apparent, 
upon analysis of the facts, that the impairment of Dr. 
Fishier's defenses in this case are in fact nominal. 
This second factor should not weigh heavily in the 
Court's decision to grant dismissal for failure to pro-
secute. 
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The third factor cited in States Steamship is 
the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt 
d i s p o s I : i o ii o f 1 aw s u i t s , 11 i s w e 1 ] s e 111 e d t h a t i f 
Plaintiff had had al 1 his witnesses present in Court 
and had beeiI ready to proceed without requesting a 
continuance, dismissal of the case for failure to pro-
secute would have been an abuse of discretion. Even 
t h o u g h t: 1 I e PI a i n t i f f w a s 2 a c k i n g a i i i m p o r t a n t w i t n ess 
and would have preferred to continue the trial, Pla i n-
tiff was willing to proceed and could have stated a 
cause of action (whi ch has been discussed above) . The 
policy of the law In favor of prompt dispostion of law-
siii t s i s good and PI a i i i t i ff has i lot abused t h i s pol i cy. 
Plaintiff was ready to proceed when so ordered by the 
Court. There may have been delay in bringing the case 
to ti: i; i I but Plalnti ff was ready to proceed with trial 
when s ordered. As explained in Appellant's princi-
pa ] bri e if, tl ii s does i lot consti tute del ay suffi ci exit to 
warrant dismissal. Although Plaintiff may not have con-
cluded the lawsuit as promptly as possible, the delays 
-i lei i so proloi lged as to warrant dismissal when 
Appellant was i n Court and ready to proceed. Since 
tne iec orecedents clear] y i nd i cat :e tl lat Appe] lant 
should ... • -i-..'. v i.iie case dismissed for failure to pro-
secute, ^ L cannot be maintained that Appellant has 
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violated the policy of the law favoring the prompt dispo-
sition of lawsuits. 
The fourth factor to be considered in a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute is the duty of the Plaintiff 
to proceed with due diligence. Even though Plaintiff 
has been dilatory at a prior time in preparing for 
trialt his case should not be dismissed where it is 
now being diligently prosecuted. Ayers v. D. F. Quillen 
& Son, Inc., 188 A 2d 510 (1963) (cited in Appellant's 
principal brief). Plaintiff was proceeding with due 
diligence in that he was ready to proceed with trial 
when so ordered by the Court. 
When these four factors are considered together ? 
and viewed in the light of the facts of this case, it 
is apparent that the scale tips in favor of not grant-
ing dismissal. It is so apparent, in fact, that grant-
ing a dismissal in this situation constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. 
. Respectfully Submitted, 
FULLMER AND HARDING 
;' 540 East Fifth South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
-Attorneys for Appellant. 
» 
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